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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

Salt Lake City, in defending this Ordnance, appears to be

playing the only card that it has.

It is casting the Ordinance as

something that it is not: an ordinance designed to protect against
adult entertainment or public indecency.

The ordinance is a

regulation of dancing, without anything more.

As such, it is an

invalidated infringement on constitutional protections.
II.

Defendant has properly identified a state constitutional

basis for additional protection of her rights to free expression.
The Utah Supreme Court has previously stated that there are such
independent protections.

Defendant asks that her right to free
1

expression be reviewed in light of those additional constitutional
protections.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAS NOT IDENTIFIED AN
INTEREST ADDRESSED BY THIS ORDINANCE.

IMPORTANT OF

SUBSTANTIAL

Defendant was convicted of dancing without a license, and not
of any lewd behavior.
Defendant

in this action was convicted

solely of

dancing

without a license, in a place in which alcoholic beverages were
sold.

The

content

of

the

dancing

was

not

at

issue;

and

observations of what particular dancers did or what particular
dancers wore are not relevant.

The question here

is whether

dancing in an establishment which sells alcoholic beverages can be
regulated

and

licensed

alcoholic beverages.

solely because

of the presence

of

the

This is not an adult entertainment case.

This ordinance is specifically designed to license dancers who are
not adult entertainers.
this regulation.

As such, the City lacks the power to enact

Plaintiff has sought to justify the regulations

based on "a line of cases based on California v. LaRue" (Appellee

2

Brief page 9) . This is done despite the overruling of that case by
44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S.Ct. 1495 (1996).

The

City contends that the reasoning of LaRue continues to allow
regulation of "dancing of the sort involved in the present matter"
(id.) .

There was no determination in the lower Court of what

"sort" of dancing was involved.

The only thing that was at issue

was whether there was dancing, and whether there was a license.
The City's efforts to bolster its ordinance with this authority are
completely misplaced.
The City also cites Young v. American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S.
50

(1976) and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41

(1986) .

In doing so, the City continues to cast its present

ordinance as "a public indecency statute" (Appellee's Brief page
11).

Unlike all of the other cases cited by Defendant in Points I

and II of its Brief, this case does not involve the type of adult
entertainment which has been regulated under the test set forth in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

The City has

articulated no reason for the current ordinance which is "unrelated
to the suppression of free expression," as required by the O'Brien
test.

The attempts to claim that this is an adult entertainment

3

case in which "secondary effects" is regulated, have no merit.
Neither is this an exercise of the "authority to provide for the
public health, safety, and morals."
expression, and only expression.

This ordinance regulates

The ordinance differentiates

between the type of entertainment regulated and that which is not
regulated, solely on the basis of whether alcohol is present. That
is exactly what 44 Liquormart prohibits.

It is also the type of

"blanket restriction" on expression prohibited by Reno v. American
Civil Liberties Union, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1996).

The only way that

the City can hope to prevail is to convince this Court that this
case is something that it is not.

Salt Lake City has separately

regulated adult entertainment and public indecency.

If this were

an attempt to regulate public indecency, in a manner similar to
Renton, it might have some validity.

It is not such an ordinance.

Plaintiff obviously fails to identify any compelling interest that
the City has in this ordinance.
identify

an

important

of

The City likewise fails to

substantial

governmental

interest,

pursuant to the Renton test.
Defendant quotes, in two places, Dodgers Bar & Grill, Inc. v.
Johnson County Board of County Commissioners, 32 F.3d 1436 (10th

4

Cir. 1994) for the proposition that the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals has upheld regulations such as this.
Dodgers Grill is inappropriate in two respects.

The reference to
First, that case

was based on California v. LaRue. which has been repudiated by the
United States Supreme Court.

Secondly, it was a case directly

involving adult entertainment and the requirement that dancers
"wear a g-string and pasties" (Appellee's Brief page 15). This is
not a case in which dancers are legitimately required to maintain
certain

standards of decency.

This is only a case

licenses are required for the very act of dancing.

in which

Plaintiff has

made no attempt to differentiate between the conduct which is
licensed in establishments serving alcohol, and the exact same
conduct which is allowed without a license, in establishments which
do not serve alcohol.

Their failure to differentiate renders this

ordinance unconstitutional.

The City has tried to obscure the

obvious issue here by stating that at least one dancer was employed
as a nude or semi-nude dancer in an adjacent city (Appellee's Brief
page 3).

Once again, this is not an ordinance designed at specific

conduct which might be properly regulated by the City.

5

It is an

severe overbreadth which requires this Court to strike this law as
unconstitutional.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF HAS PROVIDED A PROPER BASIS FOR USING THE UTAH STATE
CONSTITUTION TO GRANT HER RELIEF.
Plaintiff suggests that Defendant has not properly presented
her right to claim relief under the Constitution of the State of
Utah.

Defendant believes she has fully briefed the issue, with

what law is available in the State of Utah.
Plaintiff

dismisses

the ruling of this Court

in West

v.

Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994) in which this court
stated

that

there

is

an

independent

Constitution for expressive freedoms.

protection

in

the

Utah

This provision, like that of

the First Amendment, was drafted to protect minority viewpoints
from the oppressive power of majority disfavor, using the power of
government.
It is perhaps instructive to look at actions of the Utah
Supreme

Court

regarding

other

important

guaranteed by both Constitutions.

an

fundamental

right

The United States Supreme Court,

in the case of United States v. Miller. 425 U.S. 435 (1976) held
that a depositor of a financial institution has no
6

legitimate

expectation of privacy in his bank records, and consequently has no
standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge their seizure.
The Supreme Court of Utah, however, found that Article I Section 14
of the Constitution of Utah does indeed protect personal records,
in the case of State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991).

The

Supreme Court held:
We hold that under article I section 14 of the Utah
Constitution, defendants under the facts of this case had
a right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures of their bank statements, "checks, savings,
bonds, loan applications, loan guarantees, and all papers
which [they] supplied to the bank to facilitate the
conduct [their] financial affairs upon the reasonable
assumption
that
the
information
would
remain
confidential." 810 P.2d at 418.
This Court did not base its holding in that case on either the
text

of

the

Constitutional

provisions, or its history.

Both

provisions protect individuals from "unreasonable" intrusions of
government officials.

This Court made a determination that the

intrusions of governmental officials in seizing documents from
banks were not reasonable.
been

unwilling

to

make

The United States Supreme Court has

the

same

determination.

Thankfully,

citizens of this State have an added protection against a practise
that really is not reasonable.

Plaintiff asks this Court to make

7

the same kind of determination here.

Other courts have found

sufficient authority in constitutional law to protect expression in
this manner; and it is a freedom that is under attack based solely
on the content of the message conveyed.
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court declined, in Bowers
v. Hardwick. 478 U.S. 186
Georgia,

to

extend

the

(1986), a case out of the State of
constitutional

consensual homosexual acts.

right

to

privacy

to

It took another 12 years for the

Georgia Supreme Court to declare that such a right exists under the
Georgia Constitution; but it did so in November, 1998, in the case
of Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18, (Ga. 1998).

Once again, it is

not textual differences in the constitutions which have been relied
upon; but instead a determination by the State's highest court that
the government has no legitimate interest in regulating certain
aspects of intimate relations.

Defendant believes that the City of

Salt

its

Lake

has

gone

beyond

legitimate

functions

in

the

regulations it has applied to her; and this Court should so find.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff fails in its efforts to identify valid interests
which it is seeking to protect in the instant ordinance.

8

It

attempts to shift the focus to matters which are not at issue, to
hide

its inability to identify those interests.

protected

by both Federal

and State Constitutions

Defendant
from

is

this

attempt to abridge her freedom of expression,
DATED this

day of May, 1999

W. Andrew McCullougm
Attorney for Appellant
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